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PETER A. HOLLAND* 
The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small 
Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in 
Debt Buyer Cases   
Abstract 
Recent years have seen the rise of a new industry which has clogged the dockets of small 
claims courts throughout the country.  It is known as the “debt buyer” industry.  Mem-
bers of this $100 billion per year industry exist for no reason other than to purchase 
consumer debt which others have already deemed uncollectable, and then try to succeed 
in collecting where others have failed.  Debt buyers pay pennies on the dollar for this 
charged off debt, and then seek to collect, through hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, 
the full face value of the debt.  The emergence and vitality of this industry presents sev-
eral legal, ethical and economic issues which merit exploration, study and scholarly de-
bate.   
This article focuses on the problem of robo-signing and the lack of proof in debt buy-
er cases.  Although this problem has received limited attention from the media and 
from regulators, there is a paucity of legal scholarship about debt buyers in general, and 
this problem in particular.  This article demonstrates that robo-signing and fraud are 
rampant in this industry, and that the debt buyers who pursue these claims often lack 
proof necessary to show that they own the debt, and often lack proof even that a debt 
was ever owed in the first place.  The fact that this lack of proof has led to consumers 
being sued twice on the same debt demonstrates the due process concerns which are im-
plicated when courts enter judgments against consumers based on robo-signing and in-
sufficient proof.   
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This article calls on courts to hold plaintiffs in debt buyer cases to the same stan-
dards required of other litigants.  Courts must require a demonstration of personal 
knowledge of the matter at issue before any affidavit is accepted, before any person testi-
fies, and before any documents are admitted into evidence. 
I. Introduction 
A victim of identity theft receives a credit card bill for $4,000 on a frau-
dulent account about which she has no knowledge.  Although the bank holding the 
account acknowledges the identity theft and closes the account, the bank later sells 
the account to a debt buyer, which makes harassing phone calls and threatens to sue 
the victim. 
A widowed senior citizen files for bankruptcy, and obtains a full discharge of all 
credit card debt.  Despite this, two of her credit card accounts are sold to a debt 
buyer, and she gets sued on an account which the bankruptcy court has already dis-
charged.   
A veteran settles a debt with his credit card company and obtains a full release 
from any further liability.  Nevertheless, the credit card company sells this account 
to a debt buyer and he gets sued, even though the debt has already been satisfied. 
Some version of each of the above scenarios is replicated every day in states 
across the country.   
One common thread in the consumers’ stories above is the fact that their adver-
saries never actually extended credit to these consumers. Rather, these adversaries 
are purchasers of defaulted debt.  The goal of the debt buyer is to purchase—for 
pennies on the dollar—debts that have already been deemed uncollectable by the 
original creditor, and then collect all, most or some of the debt and thereby make a 
handsome profit.1 Once deemed uncollectable, these debts are bought and sold, of-
ten several times over, sometimes for just a fraction of a penny on the dollar.2 It is 
not uncommon for a debt buyer to pay as little as $30.00 for an old credit card debt 
                                                                
 1. See Laura Gunderson, Take Good Sniff Before ‘Settling’ Old Bills, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 4, 2009 (“[A] 
zombie or scavenger debt collector . . . buy[s] up old, typically charged-off accounts for a fraction of the original 
amount and tr[ies] to track down the debt—often after t has or is about to expire and sometimes, even after it's 
already been paid.”) 
 2. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES COULD BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
28-29 (2009) (Estimating cost of as little as one to two cents per dollar depending on its age and other qualities; 
noting that “resale of debt has increased in recent years . . . and debt can be resold multiple times. One debt 
buyer estimated that almost half of all credit card accounts purchased directly from original creditors eventually 
are resold.”) 
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on which the payday could be more than $1,000.00.3 When collection proves un-
fruitful, the debt is sold again.4 Debts which seemingly die and then come to life 
again are known as “zombie debts.”5  
Debt buyers shy away from large-value cases, which would require formal proof 
that complies with the forum state’s rules of evidence.  Instead, debt buyers rely on 
overburdened “small claims courts,” where the state court formal rules of evidence 
typically do not apply.6 There, debt buyers argue that the court need not apply evi-
dentiary standards such as hearsay, authenticity of documents, proof of chain of as-
signment, or certainty as to the amount of damages.7 Rather, the debt buyers argue 
that informal proof of the debt, such as affidavits by a debt buyer’s own employee, 
                                                                
 3. For example, in its March 28, 2011 press release charging one of the nation’s largest debt buyers with 
robo-signing, the Minnesota Attorney General, citing the publicly traded Encore Capital Group, Inc.’s most 
recent Form 10-K statement, pointed out that Encore and its subsidiaries, Midland Funding LLC and Midland 
Credit Management, Inc., spent less than $2 billion to obtain almost $55 billion (i.e.3 cents on the dollar) to 
obtain charged off debt, on which it then filed 245,000 collection lawsuits: 
Midland and its publicly-traded parent corporation, Encore Capital Group, Inc., have paid 
more than $1.8 billion to obtain 33 million customer accounts with a face value of about 
$54.7 billion, or an average cost of about three cents on the dollar, according to Encore’s 2010 
Form 10-K. Midland and Encore buy electronic portfolios containing billions of dollars of 
old, charged-off consumer debt from credit card companies, banks, telecommunications 
firms, and other creditors. These include Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Wells 
Fargo, HSBC, Providian, and Verizon Wireless, among others. Several of these banks, includ-
ing Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citibank, also provided Midland with financing 
to pursue its debt acquisitions and collections. For example, Encore currently has a $410 mil-
lion revolving credit line to acquire consumer debt from many of the same banks that have 
sold debt to Midland, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank. 
See http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/110328debtbuyers.asp  
 4. See  CLAUDIA WILNER & NASOAN SHEFTEL-GOMES, NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, ET 
AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 
13 (2010), available at http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/DEBT_ DECEPTION_FINAL_WEB.pdf 
(discussing an aspect of the debt buying process where debt is sold again after collection efforts have proven 
unsuccessful or futile). 
 5. See, e.g., Liz Pulliam Weston, Zombie Debt is Hard to Kill, MSN MONEY, July 24, 2006, available at 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/SavingandDebt/ManageDebt/ZombieDebtColle ctorsDigUpYourOld-
Mistakes.aspx; Henry Woodward, Beware the Return of the Undead Debt, ROANOKE TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at 1 
(“Zombie debt is mostly credit card accounts come back from the dead—so long overdue that the credit card 
issuers had given up on collecting it.”). 
 6. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-101, which states that, except for the rules relating to competency of witnesses, 
the Maryland rules of evidence do not apply to small claim actions.  See also, Lauren Goldberg, Dealing in Debt: 
The High-Stakes World of Debt-Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 729, 741–45 (2006) (“The mi-
nimal procedural formalities, relaxed rules of evidence, and less onerous pleading requirements of small-claims 
courts offer collection lawyers a swift sword of judgment against debtors and give lawyers leeway to file cases 
that would not survive in general civil court.”).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “small-claims court” as “a court 
that informally and expeditiously adjudicates claims that seek damages below a specified monetary amount, 
usu. claims to collect small accounts or debts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9
th
 ed. 2009).  
 7. Id.  
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should be sufficient to prove standing to sue (i.e. chain of assignment uninterrupted 
from original creditor to the current debt buyer), liability and damages.8   
According to one debt buyer industry group known as the Association of Credit 
and Collection Professionals, (commonly referred to as “ACA International”), there 
is a “challenge to obtain original documentation” of purchased debt, including the 
“contract underlying the debt at issue.” 9  According to ACA International, docu-
mentation “establishing proof [that] the consumer debt at issue existed” is often 
lacking.10   In the words of ACA International, the documentation “is often unat-
tainable for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the original 
creditor no longer has the information or did not have it when selling an account or 
turning an account over for collection.”11 
Rather than a true adversary system, the debt buyer litigation model is characte-
rized by a sophisticated business represented by a skilled lawyer suing an unsophis-
ticated, unrepresented consumer in which no formal rules of evidence are applied, 
and rank hearsay is rampant.12   
 This article examines the debt buying industry as it functions within the small 
claims courts system, from the standpoint of consumer protection, where the 
amount in controversy in any given case is, for example in Maryland, less than 
$5,000.00.13  The author concurs with the conclusion reached by the Federal Trade 
Commission that “the current system is broken” and that substantial reforms are 
needed.14 This article argues that access to justice is currently under attack by the 
purveyors of shoddy evidence because of lax—and often unenforced—procedural 
                                                                
 8. Rick Jurgens & Robert J. Hobbs, The Debt Machine: How the Collection Industry Hounds Consumers and 
Overwhelms Courts, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR , 21, 23 (July 2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/ im-
ages/pdf/pr-reports/debt-machine.pdf .  
 9. Letter from ACA International to the Maryland Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure District Court Subcommittee (Jan. 19, 2011)(on file with the author). 
 10. Id. at  2. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 1;  Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 8, at 5. Wilner and 
Sheftel-Gomes discussed the legal issues implicated in lawsuits arising from unethical debt buying practices and 
noted that the due process doctrine is implicated when the defendants do not receive notice of the lawsuits or 
knowledge of their legal defenses. See WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 1. Standing  issues and laws of 
Evidence, Contracts and Torts are implicated when debt buyers fail to obtain documentation of original lending 
contracts, which subsequently lead to dismissal of cases that lack evidence of contractual rights to receive the 
underlying debt. See id. at 5–7 (discussing debt buyers’ deceptive collection methods, lack of documentation of 
debts, lack of contractual right to documentation of debts, and lack of admissible evidence of the debt); Jurgens 
& Hobbs, supra note 8, at 5 (describing debt collectors’ various methods of harassing debtors). 
 13. See infra notes 38–44 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying perspectives of the consumer 
debt buying industry and the inadequate protective services for consumers). 
 14. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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rules, and that greater enforcement of existing procedural safeguards is needed.15  
Like the robo-signing crisis which is now infamous in the foreclosure context, simi-
lar issues of robo-signing and other shortcuts have led to a de facto system of robo-
justice, which all too often wrongly enters judgment against unrepresented con-
sumers, despite lack of sufficient proof as to liability, standing or damages.16 
 Because the formal rules of evidence generally do not apply in small claims 
cases,17 courts may overrule objections based on hearsay and the unreliability of 
documents alleged to be “business records” submitted as proof of the existence of a 
debt. As a result, debt buyers are able to admit hearsay into evidence in small claims 
courts that they would not be able to admit in large claims courts where the formal 
rules of evidence would preclude the hearsay. As many observers have noted, and as 
the industry itself has admitted, debt buyers and even original creditors frequently 
lack sufficient documentation to prove standing, liability and damages.18  Yet, de-
spite this lack of proof, debt buyers have been successful at winning billions of dol-
lars in default judgments through our court system.19 It is this author’s view that if 
courts were more vigilant in requiring (1) basic proof regarding a consumer’s un-
derlying liability on a contract, (2) a debt buyer’s standing to sue by virtue of an un-
interrupted chain of title, and (3) accurately calculated damages, the system would 
relieve overburdened dockets and produce fairer results for all involved.   
 In Part II, I examine the nature and history of the debt buying industry.  I 
trace its growth, its business model, and the legal strategies it employs to collect 
consumer debt.  In Part III, I argue that courts must demand stricter proof from 
debt buyers.  In doing so, I survey the legal requirements which exist in Maryland 
and in other states for the admission of the type of documentary evidence which is 
typical in debt buyer cases.  Part III also explains how and why rank hearsay is rou-
tinely admitted in small claims actions, and the impact this has on access to justice, 
and I argue that in debt buyer cases, it is essential to require personal knowledge of 
affiants and testifying witnesses.  In Part IV the article concludes that courts, as the 
gate keepers in charge of access to justice, must insist that witnesses have personal 
knowledge of the matters about which they seek to testify in debt buyer cases. 
                                                                
 15. See infra notes 51–56. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See for example Maryland Rule 5-101 which states in pertinent part: “The rules in this Title other than 
those relating to the competency of witnesses do not apply to the following proceedings: . . . (4)  Small claim 
actions under Rule 3-701 and appeals under Rule 7-112(d)(2). . . .” MD. R. EVID. 5-101. 
 18. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, Goldberg, supra note 6, at 745–46.  See also,  supra note 9. 
 19. See infra Part II.   
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II. The Debt Buying Industry 
In the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, 14.6 percent of 
the U.S. population have lost their jobs and the unemployment rate remains at a 
staggering 9.6 percent.20 While there is some indication of economic recovery,21 at 
least one industry—debt collection, has not only survived, but has continued to 
thrive through recession. From 1990 to 2007, employment in the third-party debt 
collection industry has more than doubled.22 In 2007, the debt industry posted an-
nual revenue of $57.9 billion.23   
A. Scope, Business Model, and Legal Strategies 
In 2003, Americans had 1.46 billion credit cards, for an average of five credit cards 
per person.24 These credit cards became crucial to many as the cost of living rose 
and real wages fell, thereby forcing low-income consumers to rely on credit cards to 
pay for basic living expenses.25 By 2009, outstanding consumer loans exceeded $2.5 
trillion,26 of which debt from credit cards and other revolving credit debt was nearly 
$1 trillion at its peak,27 with subprime credit cards constituting more than a quarter 
of the credit card market.28 In short, loans that were easy to obtain initially, even-
tually became impossible to repay.29 
Of course, in a difficult economy many consumers cannot repay their debt, and 
some simply stop doing so.30 While creditors may initially hope to collect on the 
debts, after a prolonged period of non-payment, creditors “charge-off” unpaid ac-
counts, bundle them into a portfolio, and then sell them to third-party debt buy-
                                                                
 20. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-11-0129, The Employment Situation—January 2011, (Feb. 
2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit02042011.pdf. 
 21. See Catherine Rampell, Hiring is on the Rise, but Jobless Rate Remains at 9.6%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, 
at A0 (reporting that the United States economy added 151,000 jobs in October). 
 22. See PWC, Value of Third-Party Debt Collection to the U.S. Economy in 2007: Survey and Analysis, ACA 
INT’L, 3 (June 12, 2008), available at http://www.acainternational.org/images /12546/pwc2007-final.pdf (finding 
that employment in the debt collection industry has risen from less than 70,000 people in 1990 to 157,000 in 
2007). Based on a survey of third-party debt collectors, employment in the debt collection industry is actually 
closer to 217,000 in 2007. Id. 
 23. See id. at 2 (“total debt recovered was reported to be $57.9 billion according to a survey of third-party 
debt collection agencies, of which $51.9 billion represented gross collections on a commission basis.”). 
 24. Robert J. Samuelson, Unwinding the Credit Boom, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2006, at A15. 
 25. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 3. 
 26. Rick Jurgens & Robert J. Hobbs, supra note 8, at 5. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.. 
 29. See Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 8 (noting the increasing rate at which consumers fall behind on re-
payment of their loans). 
 30. See David Streitfeld, When Debtors Decide to Default, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2009, available at   
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/weekinreview/26streitfeld.html 
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ers.31 Given that lenders classify these charged-off accounts as worthless, debt buyers 
are able to purchase portfolios for pennies on the dollar.32 Once acquiring these un-
paid accounts, debt buyers attempt to collect the full outstanding balance, often by 
directly suing consumers in state court.33  
Debt buying became a lucrative industry very quickly, ranking among the fast-
est-growing sectors of all financial services over the past decade.34 By 2005, debt 
buyers were purchasing more than $110 billion in debt annually,35 with charged-off 
credit card debt accounting for 91% of this amount.36 The net income at four major 
debt buying firms increased by more than 700% from 2001 to 2006.37 By the indus-
try’s own estimate, sales of charged-off consumer debt will have exceeded $86 bil-
lion by 2010.38 
In the majority of debt buyer cases, the courts grant the debt buyer a default 
judgment because the consumer has failed to appear for trial.39 In many of these in-
stances, debtors simply do not know they have been sued.40  Debt buyers often send 
notices to addresses listed in the underlying credit card accounts; however, these 
accounts are frequently several years old and contain outdated contact informa-
                                                                
 31. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 MO. L. REV. 707, 
713–14 (2008). Typically, a creditor will remove unpaid accounts from its balance sheet after 180 days of con-
tinued non-payment. Id. Creditors “charge-off” debt in order to obtain a bad-debt deduction under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Id. at 713. “‘Charge off’ is an accounting term for retail credit loans that have been delin-
quent or past due for 180 days and which the creditor treats as a loss.” WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, 
at n. 6. 
 32. Id. at 714. 
 33. See WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the various methods in which a debt buy-
er can attempt to collect the debts or pass on the debt by reselling the debt portfolio). If a debt buyer decides 
that collection on a particular account is either futile or unprofitable, it often sells that account to another debt 
buyer, who in turn may also sell the account, and so on. Id. 
 34. See Michael Rezendes et al., No Mercy for Consumers: Firms’ Tactics Are One Mark of a System That 
Penalizes Those Who Owe, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2006, at A1 (noting that the debt collection industry has ex-
ploded since consumer debt increased due to m llions of Americans’ heavy reliance on credit card debt).  
 35. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Haneman, supra note 31, at 715 (highlighting the significance of debt-buyers’ role in the debt col-
lection industry through the projection that sales of charged-off consumer debt will exceed $86 billion by 2010). 
 39. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 6. In a sample of 336 debt buyer cases in New York City, 
researchers found that debt buyers obtained default judgments in four out of five cases (81.4%). Id. at 8. See also 
Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented 
Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 119 (1997) (finding that default judgment occurred in 70% to 90% of consum-
er cases). 
 40. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 6. 
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tion.41 In addition, many process servers simply fail to serve papers but nonetheless 
sign false affidavits of service with the court.42 
Debtors who do receive notice usually appear without legal representation43 be-
cause they either (1) cannot afford an attorney, or (2) cannot find an attorney who 
will take their case.44 Indeed, an attorney’s decision to represent a low-income client 
often depends on whether there are funds to pay for the representation.45 The gen-
eral rule of the American adversarial system states that each party will pay their own 
attorney’s fees regardless of who is the prevailing party.46 Thus, notwithstanding vi-
able counterclaims, a successful defense in a debt buyer case will not produce any 
funds to be paid to a defense counsel.47 As a result, consumer debtors, who lack any 
knowledge of their legal rights, must resort to appearing pro se and stumble through 
complex procedural and substantive legal issues that even some trained attorneys 
do not fully understand.48 Many debt buyers have been known to exploit unrepre-
                                                                
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (defining this process as “sewer service,” in which the process servers file false affidavits of ser-
vice with the courts instead of throwing them in the “sewer”). In Pfau v. Forster & Garbus,  the New York Attor-
ney General filed su t against 35 debt collection law firms and two debt collection companies that obtained 
more than 100,000 default judgments allegedly entered because their process server engaged in “sewer service.” 
Id. (discussing Order to Show Cause, Pfau v. Forster & Garbus, No. I2009-8236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 21, 2009)); 
see Velocity Invs., LLC v. McCaffrey, No. 1674/07, 2011 WL 420661, at *2 (N.Y. Dist. Ct., Feb. 2, 2011) (ex-
plaining the Pfau action and stating that it has been settled by consent order). 
 43. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 7. In New York, for example, only 1% of defendants sued 
by creditors were represented by an attorney. Id. 
 44. Haneman, supra note 31, at 721–24 (arguing that the typical consumer debtor’s “choice” to appear and 
defend pro se is involuntary); see WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 13 for a discussion of the consumer 
debtor as pro se defendant. 
 45. Haneman, supra note 31, at 723 (noting that pro bono representation is also difficult to find because the 
public lacks sympathy for default debtors). 
 46. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2139, 2156–57 (2010) (“ ‘Our basic point 
of reference’ when considering the award of attorney's fees is the bedrock principle known as the ‘ American 
Rule:’ Each litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”) 
(citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The 
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 4 DUKE L. J. 651, 651 (1982). 
 47. Haneman, supra note 31, at 722.  As a result, not only can many consumers not afford lawyers for these 
cases, but lawyers are hesitant to take them, since the cases are unlikely to cover their costs.  Stewart Macaulay, 
Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 L. AND SOC. REV 116, 129, 132–33 (1979).  
 48. See Goldberg, supra note 6, 744–45.  As Goldberg notes, 
 “[m]ost critics agree that repeat players, like the debt-buying companies, have the upper 
hand over first-time users of the legal system, and consequently, have a greater chance of suc-
cess. Lawsuits are foreign and intimidating for inexperienced debtors. Defendants often de-
fault, rather than appear in court, because ‘they fail to understand the complaint or because 
they concede defeat, unaware of possible defenses. . . .’” Id. [D]ebt-buying companies inten-
tionally target poor and unsophisticated debtors for the very reason that they are unlikely to 
understand the legal process or know what their rights are. Id. 
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sented consumers by pressuring them into unreasonable settlements,49 by filing 
claims without having or being able to produce adequate proof,50 and by ignoring 
legal requirements with the knowledge that the untrained consumer will fail to ob-
ject.51 
One indication of the imbalance of power is the rate of judgments against con-
sumers—and particularly default judgments—resulting from those claims.  For ex-
ample, a recent study estimates that 45% of debt collection cases result in default 
judgments in Cook County, Illinois; another found that 80% of those in New York 
City do.52 These high rates result in part because both consumers and courts simply 
assume that the debt allegedly owed is accurately portrayed as presented by their 
plaintiff, and so they fail to challenge it.53  Debt buyers know this, and as a result, 
have found the use of courts to be a highly effective component of their business 
plan.54  
                                                                                                                                                    
It is questionable whether, under these circumstances, we can still claim to have an “adversarial” system.  See 
Haneman, supra note 31, at 722 (internal citations omitted): 
The Anglo-American adversary system has been described as a "sporting" system of justice.  Its roots 
lie in classical philosophy, which has long embraced debate and argument as the method of deriving 
truth.  Truth, or at least justice where truth cannot be ascertained, is found in evidence and argu-
ment offered to a court by contending partisans . . . . An adversary system functions well enough 
when the knowledge and skills of both contending advocates are, if not roughly equal, then at least 
above some threshold level. The competent presentation of claims and defenses and the effective 
maneuvering through complex procedural rules rests fully on the advocates' skills and resources. As 
equality between them declines, so too does the system's ab lity to redeem the promises implicit in 
Lady Justice's scales. This inequality reaches its maximum when an unrepresented litigant is 
matched against a trained attorney. By that point the premise of the system is proven false—a fail-
ure described by the system's critics as the "adversary myth.”  Id. 
 49. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that debt buyers also wield significant power to 
freeze debtor accounts and garnish wages). 
 50. Id. at 7, 15 (finding that common practice of debt collection law firms in New York includes “seeking 
default judgments on the basis of false and/or legally inadequate affidavits”). 
 51. See Haneman, supra note 31, at 708–09, 717 (discussing the practice of debt buyers filing claims known 
to be past the statute of limitations period). 
 52. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 41. 
 53. Haneman, supra note 31, at 709 (The debtor sees only this: an attorney (a professional licensed by the 
state) bringing a claim in a court (an extension of the state tasked to the cause of justice and application of the 
rule of law) asserting the validity of a debt. The typical consumer debtor would find it difficult to believe that a 
creditor's attorney could knowingly, and ethically, bring a lawsuit and obtain a judgment on an out-of-statute 
debt.”). 
 54. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 741 (noting that debt buyers have recently turned to courts at higher rates in 
order to increase their rates of return on the debts, and that this strategy has been successful). 
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B. Emerging Issues of Documentation 
Despite the assumptions of reliable documentation by courts and consumers, credi-
tors’ documentation of debt is often times far from complete55 and indeed well be-
low the standards demanded by state or federal rules of evidence.56  Debt buyers of-
ten lack original credit card agreements, copies of bills or credit slips, records of 
payments or disputes, or even evidence that claims have been assigned to them.57  
Instead, they often have only a spreadsheet or database  summarizing the hundreds 
or thousands of accounts they have purchased from an original creditor or inter-
mediate debt buyer.58  The fact of faulty documentation in the consumer market is 
real and substantial enough that, according to the Federal Trade Commission, 
judges themselves have observed repeated confusion by consumers over where a 
debt comes from.59  Because of the problems of documentation, debt buyers often 
drop lawsuits when challenged by a consumer in small-claims court.60 
The media has reported widely on the extent of “robo-signing” in the context of 
foreclosure.61  Robo-signing refers to the practice of signing affidavits and other 
documents “so quickly that they could not possibly have verified the information in 
the document under review.”62 In Maryland, consumers and the courts discovered 
that lawyers at some foreclosure law firms did not sign affidavits that bore their 
purported signature, but instead instructed their employees to reproduce their sig-
natures.63 The Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the problem by approving 
                                                                
 55. A study of debt collection cases in New York found that 99% of cases reviewed in the study where de-
fault judgments were entered had inadequate proof of the debt owed. URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, DEBT WEIGHT: 
THE CONSUMER CREDIT CRISIS IN NEW YORK AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 7, 9, October 2007, availa-
ble at http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/CDP_ Debt_Weight.pdf.  
 56. Id. See also infra, Part III. 
 57. See supra notes 10-12. 
 58. WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 22. 
 59. FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION 16 (2010)[herinafter “FTC”], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf. 
 60. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 746. The author’s experience as director of the Consumer Law Clinic has 
been that once our student attorneys get involved, the overwhelming majority of cases are dismissed.  Moreo-
ver, in the overwhelming majority of cases we have litigated, evidence of standing, liability and damages is woe-
fully lacking. 
 61.  See, e.g. David Streitfeld, JPMorgan Suspending Foreclosures N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010. “Chase and 
GMAC, in their zeal to process hundreds of thousands of foreclosures as quickly as possible and get those prop-
erties on the market, employed people who could sign documents so quickly they popularized a new term for 
them: “robo-signer.”  See also infra note 67. 
 62. Gretchen Morgenson & Andrew Martin, Big Legal Clash on Foreclosure is Taking Shape, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2010, at A1. 
 63. Jamie Smith Hopkins, Court OKs Review of Foreclosures in Maryland, BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 2010, at 1A. 
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emergency rules to allow the hiring of examiners to scrutinize the paperwork of fo-
reclosure robo-signers.64   
Such robo-signing practices exist in the debt collection industry as well.65 In a 
New York study, researchers found that over the course of a year, one debt buyer’s 
affiant identified himself as the custodian of records in 47,503 affidavits, thereby 
claiming to have personal knowledge of the facts of each and every case.66 An em-
ployee of debt collection firm Asset Acceptance said he was required to sign hun-
dreds of affidavits a day, and an employee of Asta Funding, another debt buyer, said 
that she signed an affidavit on average every 13 seconds.67 In one story on the televi-
sion program 60 Minutes, an admitted robo-signer named Chris Pendley admitted 
to signing 4,000 documents per day as officer of—on average—5 different banks 
per day. 68  He did so as part of a group of 12 people who sat around a table and did 
nothing other than sign fraudulent signatures all day long, and was paid $10.00 per 
hour to do so.69  In reality, he was never an officer of any bank, but rather was al-
ways an employee of a company known as “DOCX.”70   
A specific example of the depth of the problem is evidenced in reports concern-
ing the sale of charged-off debt by JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”). As the New York 
Times reported in 2010: 
 
Linda Almonte oversaw a team of advisers, analysts and managers at 
JPMorgan Chase last year, when the company was preparing the sale of 
23,000 delinquent accounts, with a face value of $200 million. With the 
debt sold at roughly 13 cents on the dollar, the sale was supposed to net $26 
million.  
As the date of the sale approached, Ms. Almonte and her employees started 
to notice mistakes and inconsistencies in the accounts.  
                                                                
 64. Jamie Smith Hopkins, Fannie Mae Raises Foreclosure Fees in MD, BALT. SUN, Jan. 22, 2011, at 6A. The 
new Maryland Court of Appeals rules order is available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/ ro-
docs/ro166.pdf. See  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 14-207.1, 1-311, 14-207 (West 2011).   
 65. See, e.g., WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 4, at 14.  Although debt buyers are required to provide 
proof of personal knowledge of the facts of the case, evidence reflects that this standard has not been enforced.  
Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A1. 
 68. 60 Minutes: The Next Housing Shock (CBS News television broadcast Apr. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7361572n (beginning at minute mark 6:47). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
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“We found that with about 5,000 accounts there were incorrect balances, 
incorrect addresses,” she said. “There were even cases where a consumer had 
won a judgment against Chase, but it was still part of the package being 
sold.”  
Ms. Almonte flagged the defects with her manager, but he shrugged them 
off, she says, and he urged her and her colleagues to complete the deal in 
time for the company’s coming earnings report. Instead, she contacted se-
nior legal counsel at the company. Within days, she was fired.71 
 
The article went on to quote one lawyer’s apt analogy: 
 
“I’ve lost four and I’ve taken about 5,000 cases,” said Jerry Jarzombek, a 
consumer lawyer in Fort Worth. “If the case goes to trial, I say to the judge, 
‘Your honor, imagine if someone came in here to give eyewitness testimony 
in a traffic accident case and they didn’t actually see the crash. They just 
read about it somewhere. Well, this is the same thing.’ The debt buyers 
don’t know anything about the debt. They just read about it.”72 
C. In Part Because of Documentation Problems, Consumers Face the Real Threat of 
Being Sued Twice on the Same Debt 
Abuses in the debt buyer industry also extend to subjecting consumers to duplica-
tive judgments on a single debt.73  Such lawsuits are all too common, in Maryland 
and elsewhere.74  Indeed, a simple Westlaw search reveals numerous examples of 
debt collectors attempting to recover debt that had already been paid or settled by 
the debtor.75 
                                                                
 71. Segal, supra note 67, at A1. 
 72. Id. (pointing out that when a consumer is aware of the legal action, he is often successful, but that lack 
of notification frequently leads to default judgments). 
 73. See infra note 93. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Cardello, 896 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., March 4, 2010) ("[O]n a 
regular basis this court encounters defendants being sued on the same debt by more than one creditor alleging 
they are the assignee of the original credit card obligation. Often these consumers have already entered into 
stipulations to pay off the outstanding balance due the credit card issuer and find themselves filing an order to 
show cause to vacate a default judgment from an unknown debt purchaser for the same obligation."); McCam-
mon v. Bibler, Newman & Reynolds, P.A., 493 F. Supp.2d 1166, 1170 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding that a collection 
agency pursued former debtor for payment and obtained judgment despite knowing that former debtor had 
paid original creditor); Grimsley v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., No. 08-548 (JRT/RLE), 2009 WL 928319, at *1 (D. 
Minn. March 31, 2009) (finding firm collecting on already paid debt); Sweatt v. Sunkidd Venture, Inc., No. 
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Reported cases from around the nation demonstrate that debtors face multiple 
collection attempts or lawsuits by competing entities—including many that lack 
standing.  Collection attempts by firms without standing come in many varieties. 
Most commonly, the debtor pays Debt Buyer A, but then Debt Buyer B later at-
tempts to collect.76 Sometimes, the debtor pays Debt Buyer A even though Debt 
Buyer A had already sold the debt to Debt Buyer B without debtor notification.77 
Other times, debtors pay the original creditor prior to a debt buyer’s collection at-
tempts.78 
There are several other ways that firms may try to collect on old debt that was al-
ready paid in full. One debt collector may attempt to collect twice on the same 
debt.79  Firms may even sue each other over the right to collect a debt.80  In any of 
these cases, if courts allow judgments based on inadmissible or shoddy evidence, 
consumers face a real threat of being sued twice on the same debt.   
Based on problems such as the documentation and multiple lawsuit issues above, 
the federal government describes the current debt collection system as “broken.”  In  
2010, the federal government stated: 
                                                                                                                                                    
C05-5406FDB, 2006 WL 1418652, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2006) (noting firm collecting on debt already 
paid); Hooper v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., No. CV 03-793-JE, 2004 WL 825619 (D. Or. Apr. 
13, 2004) (finding attempted collection on debt already paid to original creditor potentially due to original 
creditor’s bookkeeping errors); McHugh v. Check Investors, Inc., No. Civ.A. 5:02CV00106, 2003 WL 21283288, 
at *2 (W.D. Va. May 21, 2003) (finding that former debtor had paid debt before collection agency ever began 
collection attempts). 
 76. See, e.g., Overcash v. United Abstract Grp., Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 193, 195 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that 
former debtor paid collection agency, but debt was subsequently sold and resold multiple times before another 
collection firm presented former debtor with bill roughly $40,000 larger than the paid, settled amount); Chiver-
ton v. Fed. Fin. Grp., Inc., 399 F.Supp.2d 96, 99–100 (D. Conn. 2005) (determining that former debtor paid one 
collection agency, but another firm later claimed that it had bought the debt and made multiple threatening and 
harassing phone calls to the former debtor); Fontana v. C. Barry & Assocs., LLC, No. 06-CV-359A, 2007 WL 
2580490, at *1 (W.D. N.Y. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 77. See, e.g., Smith v. Mallick, 514 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining how one debt buyer had anoth-
er debt buyer reassign a judgment to him after he heard the other debt buyer was no longer trying to collect, 
without notifying the debtor or the debtor’s counsel of the reassignment).  
 78. See, e.g., Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., IP 99-1725-C-M/S, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7874, at *9–12 (S.D. Ind. April 25, 2001), later opinion, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6520, at *5–9 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2004) (finding some debts placed for collection were paid or already assigned to another 
collector). 
 79. See Capital Cred t & Collection Serv., Inc. v. Armani, 206 P.3d 1114, 1116–18 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding that debt collector settled a debt and then instituted litigation on the same debt). 
 80. See Wood v. M&J Recovery LLC, CV 05-5564, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24157, at *1 (E.D. N.Y. Apr. 2, 
2007) (featuring four different firms filing cross claims against one another for right to collect one particular 
debt). 
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Based on its extensive analysis, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or 
“Commission”), the nation’s consumer protection agency, concludes that 
neither litigation nor arbitration currently provides adequate protection 
for consumers. The system for resolving disputes about consumer debts 
is broken. . . because consumers are not adequately protected in either 
debt collection litigation or arbitration.81 
III. The Need to Demand Stricter Proof 
The lack of reliable proof from creditors and debt buyers calls out for a solution. 
While it is understandable that there are good policy reasons why the rules of evi-
dence should not always apply in small claims cases, it is equally clear that in the 
debt buyer context, “small claims courts” have in reality become “creditor’s courts,” 
devoid of the hallmark characteristics of an adversary system.  In a market econo-
my, when there is no competition, costs rise and quality falls.   Similarly, in an ad-
versary system, when there is no competition in the form of an  advocate to 
represent the consumer, the costs to the consumer rise and the quality of justice 
falls.   
A. The Role of the Debt Buyer’s “Business Records”  and Maryland’s Jurisprudence 
on Business Records 
In order to prove a proper chain of title, an underlying contract, or the amount of 
damages owed, the purchaser of charged-off debt needs to consult documents and 
records that were generated by the original creditor and by each intermediary debt 
buyer.  In order to prove their case, debt buyers usually attempt to introduce these 
hearsay documents with little or no foundation as to personal knowledge.82   
In order to prove a valid case, the debt buyer needs to convince the court that 
there was an underlying debt (typically based on an underlying contract), that there 
was a default, that there was an amount certain due and owing, and that there is a 
complete chain of assignment from the original creditor to the current debt buyer.  
Because each of these elements is hearsay (assuming the rules of evidence apply), 
the debt buyer attempts to authenticate all documents and the statements made in 
those documents as if they were the debt buyer’s own business records; as if the debt 
buyer itself had generated the documents.83  Frequently the debt buyer will attempt 
to offer this hearsay through the Rule 803(b)(6) “Business Records Exception”84 or 
                                                                
 81. FTC, supra note 59, at 1, 71 (emphasis added).  
 82. There are frequently other problems such as lack of authenticity, lack of completeness, and altered 
documents, to name a few. 
 83. See infra note 106. 
 84. Maryland follows the Federal Rules and most states in its Rule 5-803(b)(6):  
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its small claims court equivalent: “when we bought the account, we bought the pa-
perwork to prove the account, and they are all a part of our records now, and we 
know that the information is reliable and accurate.”85 
Although the rules of evidence do not apply in small claims cases, their require-
ments are instructive, because, like all testimony offered under oath in a court of 
law, central to the business records exception is the requirement of personal know-
ledge.86  And, like witness testimony in general, business records should be excluded 
“if the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation of 
the record indicate that the information in the record lacks trustworthiness.”87    
Maryland courts have refused to admit business records if the party seeking ad-
mission cannot produce a live witness or affiant with personal knowledge to verify 
the manner in which the documents were made.88 In Bernadyn v. State,89 the State 
sought to use a medical bill seized during a search warrant to establish the defen-
dant’s address.90 The defendant objected to admissibility of the bill because of the 
lack of foundation laid for the business record exception to the hearsay rule.91 The 
Court of Appeals granted certiorari on the issue of introduction of evidence without 
foundation or authentication under any exception to the hearsay rule.92 In finding 
                                                                                                                                                    
To include evidence under the business records exception, a party must show that the records meet 
certain basic requirements:  (1) the records must have been made at or near the time of the events 
that they concern; (2) they must have been made by a person with personal knowledge of the in-
formation described; (3) they must have been made in the course of regularly conducted business 
activity; and (4) the regular practice of the business must be to make and keep the records. MD. R. 
EVID. 5-803(b)(6). 
 85. See infra note 106. 
 86. Id. 
 87. MD. R. EVID. 5-803(b)(6).   
 88. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. See also MD. CODE ANN., MD. R. EVID. § 5-803(b)(6) 
(West 2011) (stating that a record of regularly conducted business activity may be admissible as an exception to 
the hearsay rule if, among other things, “it was made by a person with knowledge or from information trans-
mitted by a person with knowledge” at or near the time of the event, but that such a record “may be excluded if 
the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the 
information in the record lacks trustworthiness”). 
 89. 887 A.2d 602 (Md. 2005). 
 90. Id. at 603. The State argued that because the address on the letter was the product of nonassertive con-
duct it was not a statement, therefore the hearsay rule did not apply. Id. at 606. 
 91. Id. at 606 (“[Defendant] reasons that the bill is hearsay because it was an out-of-court statement of-
fered for its truth and that the State failed to establish that the statement satisfied any exception to the hearsay 
rule. He contends that the sender’s conduct of addressing a letter is an implied assertion and is thus hearsay. In 
the alternative, he argues that even if the bill is admissible under the business record exception, the State failed 
to lay a proper foundation for that exception.”).  
 92. Id. 
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the document inadmissible hearsay, the Court drew parallels to Collins v. Kibort,93 
where the Seventh Circuit found that, although medical bills are admissible as busi-
ness records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), the proponent of the evidence 
must establish a proper foundation as to their reliability.94 Discussing Collins, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals [the Bernadyn Court] held that: 
[A]lthough the [Collins Court] did not doubt that the hospital maintains 
its bills in the course of its regularly conducted activity and that it was part 
of the hospital's regular business practice to create and maintain its bills, 
“the business record exception does require that the witness have knowledge 
of the procedure under which the records were created.” Collins was not 
qualified to testify about the reliability of the medical bills because he knew 
nothing about the billing practices of the hospital.95 
As in Collins, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Bernadyn found that the state-
ments contained in the medical bill were inadmissible hearsay because the state 
failed to establish a foundation for the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule by presenting evidence regarding the billing practices of the medical provider 
and the source of the name and address on the medical bill.96 
                                                                
 93. 143 F.3d 331, 337–38 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee suing his employer and supervisor 
under a race discrimination claim could testify about his medical condition but could not testify about his med-
ical bills because he could not establish sufficient foundational evidence to satisfy the hearsay exception for 
business records when he did not have knowledge of the procedures under which the records were created). 
 94. Id. at 337. The Collins Court explained, 
 “[a] proper foundation is established if the party attempting to admit the evidence demonstrates 
that the business records ‘are kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity, and [that 
it] was the regular practice of that business activity to make records, as shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or otherwise qualified witness.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 95. Bernadyn, 887 A.2d at 615 (emphasis added) (citing and quoting Collins, 143 F.3d at 338). 
 96. Id. Maryland courts have also required personal knowledge in affidavits outside the context of the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Mercier v. O’Neill Assocs., Inc., 239 A.2d 564, 564–65 
n.1 (Md. 1968) (finding affidavit lacking personal knowledge insufficient under Rule 2-501 to sustain the trial 
court’s granting of summary judgment in contract payment dispute); White v. Friel, 123 A.2d 303, 305 (Md. 
1965) (finding affidavits lacking personal knowledge deficient under Summary Judgment Rule 2 in the case of a 
creditor seeking to recover on debtor’s open account, and so summary judgment was improper based on the 
uncertainties of the case);  Fletcher v. Flournoy, 81 A.2d 232, 234 (Md. 1951) (disregarding affidavit filed by 
defendant, “made by himself, ‘to the best of his knowledge, information and belief” in the case of a property 
owner seeking for possession and damages from defendant property possessors (citing State of Wash. v. Mari-
copa Cnty., 143 F.2d 871, 872 (9th Cir. 1944))). 
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B.  Other States’ Jurisprudence on Business Records  
Other states have also held that business records may only be authenticated by a 
witness with personal knowledge of the record keeping practices of the business that 
created and maintained the document.  
New York courts have repeatedly pointed to the importance of holding business-
es to the standards of Rule 803(6), including in its recent credit card debt collection 
cases involving Chase Bank.  In Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hershkovits,97  a lower 
court noted that “[w]ith respect to the foundation testimony . . . someone with per-
sonal knowledge of the business’s record making practices and procedures must lay 
the requisite foundation” and “the sponsoring witness should display some fami-
liarity with the record at issue before the item is admitted into evidence.” 98  Again, 
in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Cardello,99 the court emphasized the importance of this 
standard given problems in the industry:   
[O]n a regular basis this court encounters defendants being sued on the 
same debt by more than one creditor alleging they are the assignee of the 
original credit card obligation. Often these consumers have already entered 
into stipulations to pay off the outstanding balance due the credit card issu-
er and find themselves filing an order to show cause to vacate a default 
judgment from an unknown debt purchaser for the same obligation.100   
                                                                
 97. No. CV-062213-09 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. June 22, 2010) (breach of contract and debt recovery action against 
pro se defendant). 
 98. Id. at 3–4. 
 99. 896 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010) (debt collection action by judgment creditor’s intended assig-
nee). 
 100. Id. at 857; see also DNS Equity Group Inc. v. Lavallee, Civ. 12388/09 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2010) 
(where Plaintiff's agent based her affidavit upon documentation provided by the original creditor and did not 
have personal knowledge of the original creditor's business practices, finding proof insufficient to establish a 
proper foundation for the account agreement and account statements; "Submission of the underlying state-
ments, in proper evidentiary form, is required in assigned debt cases, like this one."); Palisades Collection, LLC 
v. Kedik,  890 N.Y.S.2d 230, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)) (“Here, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its agent 
with exhibits, including a printed copy of several pages from an electronic spreadsheet listing defendant's Dis-
cover account as one of the accounts sold to plaintiff. Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, the court properly 
determined that it failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the spreadsheet under the busi-
ness record exception to the hearsay rule.”);  see also PRA III, LLC v. Gonzalez, 864 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (overruling summary judgment based on inconsistent documents concerning defendant’s debt and 
reinstating counterclaim for filing of false affidavits by plaintiff creditor); West Valley Fire District No. 1 v. Vil-
lage of Springville,  743 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("A proper foundation for the admission of a 
business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and 
procedures."). 
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Along these lines, courts in New York and elsewhere have noted particular prob-
lems where debts are assigned from an original owner to a buyer.  In Rushmore Re-
coveries X, LLC v. Skolnick,101 a lower court found that a plaintiff’s witness’ familiari-
ty with the business records derived only from “the documents and records 
ostensibly created by Citibank, and/or assignees who have preceded the Plaintiff,” 
and because he “merely obtained the records from another entity that actually gen-
erated them.”102 Therefore his statements were “an insufficient foundation for [the 
business records’] introduction into evidence:”103  
 
The repetitive statements of . . . the Plaintiff's custodian of records, to the ef-
fect that he collects and maintains the records and documents of [the origi-
nal creditor] and/or any other prior assignees, ‘in the regular course of 
plaintiff's business,’ as if they were magic words, does not satisfy the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule. That phrase, standing alone, does 
not establish that the records upon which the Plaintiff relies were made in 
the regular course of the Plaintiff's business, that it was part of the regular 
course of the Plaintiff's business to make such records, or that the records 
were made at or about the time of the transactions recorded.”104 
In Missouri, an intermediate appellate court has, on at least three occasions, re-
jected a debt buyer’s custodian of records’ attempt to attest to the identity and 
mode of preparation of documents created by an assignor.  In Asset Acceptance v. 
Lodge,105 the court noted that “Asset did not prepare the documents in question, but 
rather only received the documents from HSBC and held them in their files.  [The 
witness] was not qualified to testify regarding documents not prepared by Asset.  
Thus, the documents do not fall under the business records exception.”106  Similarly, 
                                                                
 101. No. 21161/05 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 24, 2007) (debt purchaser assignee collection action). 
 102. Id. at 1–2 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 24, 2007). 
 103. Id. at 2 (citations omitted). 
 104. Id. (citations omitted). See also  Insurance Company of North America v. Gottlieb, 588 N.Y.S.2d 571 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“Testimony of plaintiff’s agent who merely obtained records from another entity that 
generated them was insufficient foundation for admitting the records under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule”); Standard Textile Co. v. National Equipment Rental, Ltd., 80 A.D.2d 911, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981) (“[T]he mere filing of papers received from other entities, even if they are retained in the regular course 
of business, is insufficient to qualify the documents as business records,” and so plaintiff’s employee “was not a 
qualified witness to testify as to the record keeping of another entity”);PRA III, LLC v. MacDowell, 841 N.Y.S.2d 
822, 822 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007) (finding that debt collector’s affiant is “not an employee of the original creditor 
(Sears) and cannot authenticate documents from another business”). 
 105. 325 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (breach of contract claim by loan holder’s assignee). 
 106. Id. at 529. 
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in C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC v. Somogyi,107 the court emphasized the need for 
personal knowledge: “[W]e fail to see how [the witness] can attest to the identity 
and the mode of preparation of these particular documents given that they were 
created by MBNA, a company that [the witness] neither works for, nor mentions in 
her affidavit.”108  And in Zundel v. Bommarito,109 the court stressed the need for 
business records to actually follow reliable practices: “Where the status of the evi-
dence indicates it was prepared elsewhere and was merely received and held in a file 
but was not made in the ordinary course of the holder’s business it is inadmissible 
and not within a business record exception to the hearsay rule.”110 
Other states have taken a similar approach.  In Vermont, a trial court found in 
Unifund CCR Partners v. Bonfigli111 that the plaintiff’s custodian of records was not 
qualified to testify about the original creditor’s business practices because “there 
was no evidence that he was ever employed by Chase [the original creditor] or that 
he had personal knowledge of Chase’s internal business practices.”112  The court 
stated that “Unifund itself cannot satisfy the requirements of the business record 
rule” because “[w]hile the current records are a part of Unifund’s business records, 
and therefore meet the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the Chase da-
ta incorporated in those records is itself hearsay.113 The court did not find the testi-
mony reliable or credible because the affiant “did not explain how he was so famili-
ar with Chase’s business practices, whether he had ever worked at Chase, whether 
he has ever sat down with Chase to watch how they entered the data, whether he 
had ever checked the reliability of the entries, and so forth.”114 The court concluded: 
“something more is required than merely by saying ‘we got it from them, so it must 
be true.’  There must be some assurance that the underlying records were reliable to 
begin with.”115   
                                                                
 107. 136 S.W.3d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (debt collection action by credit card assignee against cardholder). 
 108. Id. at 139. The assignee attempted to admit into evidence an affidavit by an employee, a copy of a letter 
the Defendant received from the assignee, and a copy of the Defendant’s signed credit agreement with the origi-
nal credit card holder, among else. Id. at 136 n.2. 
 109. 778 S.W. 2d 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (action against defendant’s estate to collect in quantum meruit 
upon claim of oral partnership). 
 110. Id. at 958.  
 111. No. S1295-08, 2010 WL 2259136 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 5, 2010) (debt purchaser’s credit card debt collec-
tion action based on original creditor’s electronic data, spreadsheets). 
 112. Id. at *4. 
 113. Id. at *6 (emphasis in original). 
 114. Id. at *7–8. 
 115. Id. at *12. 
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Similarly, in Palisades Collection, LLC v. Kalal, 116 a Wisconsin intermediate ap-
pellate court determined that  
 
“[t]he only reasonable reading of [the statutory business records evidence]  
language117 is that a testifying custodian must be qualified to testify that the 
records (1) were made at or near the time by, or from information trans-
mitted by, a person with knowledge; and (2) that this was done in the 
course of a regularly conducted activity.”118 Therefore, “[i]n order to be 
qualified to testify on these two points, [the witness] must have personal 
knowledge of how the account statements were prepared and that they were 
prepared in the ordinary course of [the original creditor’s] business.” 119   
In Texas, courts have asserted the same principle.  In Riddle v. Unifund CCR 
Partners, 120 an intermediate appellate court stated that “[a]lthough Rule 803(6) does 
not require the predicate witness to be the record’s creator or have personal know-
ledge of the content of the record; however, the witness must have personal know-
ledge of the manner in which the records were prepared.”121  And in Martinez v. 
Midland Credit Management, Inc.,122 an appellate court held that the debt buyer’s 
records were inadmissible as business records because its “affiant does not provide 
any information that would indicate that he (or she) is qualified to testify as to the 
                                                                
 116. 781 N.W.2d 503 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (debt purchaser’s credit card debt collection action). 
 117. Similar to Maryland, Wisconsin law requires that a “custodian of record or other qualified witness” 
testify to the business records before admission into evidence. Compare WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6) (2011) with MD. 
RULE 5-803(b)(6) (2011). 
 118. Kalal, 781 N.W.2d at 509. 
 119. Id. at 510. See also Berg-Zimmer & Assocs., Inc. v. Central Mfg. Corp., 434 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1988) (finding that although a witness may be qualified to testify that the records were created in the 
course of regularly conducted activity, the witness must have personal knowledge about the record’s creation 
and may not testify about documents given to him by a third party under the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule).  
 120. 298 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App. 2009) (debt purchaser’s credit card debt collection action based on original 
creditor’s documentation). 
 121. Id. at 782–83 (citing In re K.C.P., 142 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Tex. App. 2004)). But see Simien v. Unifund 
CCR Partners, 321 S.W.3d 235, 240–44 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding credit card issuer’s documents admissible 
under business records exception to state hearsay rule based on debt purchaser employee’s testimony that he 
had reviewed and was the agent for the documents and had personal knowledge of the books and records con-
cerning the claim, despite his inability to confirm the accuracy of the balance due, based on three-factor analy-
sis).  
 122. 250 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App. 2008) (subsequent debt holder’s debt collection action based on original 
creditor’s computer-generated documentation). 
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record-keeping practices of the ‘predecessor.’”123 This does not apply where a debt 
buyer’s employee testifies about practices of another company with whose practices 
he or she is unfamiliar.124 
Finally, in Pennsylvania a state appellate court recently upheld a trial court’s 
finding that a debt buyer’s employee did not have sufficient knowledge of the origi-
nal owner’s practices to testify as to their reliability and thus enter them into evi-
dence.  Quoting the trial court, an intermediate appellate court in Commonwealth 
Financial Systems v. Smith125 noted that:  
[t]he limits of Mr. Venditti's knowledge were vast. He could offer no clear 
response as to whether the 1996-1997 Citibank Card Agreement . . . applied 
to [Ms. Smith's account]. . . . Mr. Venditti could not say for certain whether 
[industry] requirements had actually been followed in the preparation and 
maintenance of those records because, simply put, he was never in a position 
to know.126 
Again, then, in a large claim, personal knowledge is needed to prove the basic 
elements of a debt buyer case.  It is suggested that the same standard should apply 
in a small claim where the formal rules of evidence do not apply, but where the 
rules of relevance, prejudice, veracity and reliability always apply. 
It is worth noting that in Illinois, a state appellate court took a slightly different 
but related approach in Unifund v. Shah127 to find that an affidavit stating that a debt 
had been assigned from one collector to another was not enough to prove the right 
to pursue a claim under state law.128  In addition, the court emphasized the over-
arching goal of the statute of protecting consumers: 
The possibility that debtors might be sued by a party who does not have a 
legal interest in their debt is a real danger, and the legislature has chosen to 
address this problem by demanding strict proof of an account's chain of title 
before an action may commence to collect on that account.129 
                                                                
 123. Id. at 485. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 2011 PA Super 30  (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
 126. Id. at *6. 
 127. No. 1-10-0855, 2011 WL 477725 (Il. App. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011). 
 128. Id. at 7. 
 129. Id. (citations omitted). 
280 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
Overall, these cases show that, the fact that a debt buyer’s employee purports to 
be the custodian of records does not mean he or she is “qualified” to certify the 
business records if there is no demonstrated familiarity with how these types of 
records are prepared or maintained.130 A debt buyer’s employee is not an employee 
of the businesses that purportedly created the documents.131 As the mere recipient of 
documents, she acquires no personal knowledge of the business records of any oth-
er entity.132 Additionally, “the mere filing of papers received from other entities, 
even if they are retained in the regular course of business, is insufficient to qualify 
the documents as business records.”133 Indeed, one authoritative treatise has de-
scribed the law as follows: “[a] debt buyer’s affidavit has no probative value when 
the affiant’s claimed familiarity with the assignor’s business records is derived solely 
from the affiant’s review of those records after they came into the debt buyer’s pos-
session.”134 
C.  Despite the Importance of the Business Records Exception, Courts Do Not Enforce 
It in Small Claims Court  
The Business Records Exception to the hearsay rule provides a rigorous way to es-
tablish the reliability of hearsay records introduced as evidence.  But because the 
formal rules of evidence do not apply in small claims courts, rank hearsay is often 
admitted into evidence.  As noted above, debt buyers know and take advantage of 
this fact.  Given the already-disadvantaged position of unrepresented litigants rela-
tive to debt buyers, the pursuit of poorly documented debt without regard eviden-
tiary standards in small claims courts has been nothing short of catastrophic for the 
consumers, and nothing short of overwhelming for the court system.135 
The cases outlined above show that many courts outside the small claims context 
have indeed applied the rules of evidence to debt cases,136 particularly in recent 
years, as the abuses and problems of documentation among the debt collection and 
                                                                
 130. See supra notes 106–181 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., Palisades Collection, LLC v. Kalal, 781 N.W.2d  503, 510 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding 
that debt buyer’s employee lacks personal knowledge of how documents, bank account statements, were pre-
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 132. See id. 
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 134. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COLLECTION ACTIONS 45 (1st ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
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legal interest in their debt is a real danger.” See, e.g., Randolph v. Crown Asset Management, LLC, 254 F.R.D. 513 
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buying industries have come to light.137  However, there is also evidence that in 
many cases these rules are not applied.  For example, in the mortgage context, 
where debt is frequently sold to or serviced by banks other than the originator of 
the mortgage, a study by Katherine Porter found that over 40 percent of all claims 
for mortgage debt in bankruptcy proceedings were not substantiated by the most 
basic of all documentation: the note establishing that debt is owed.138  Another 16 
percent of all claims had no documentation at all.139  Nonetheless, despite the lack of 
documentation, Professor Porter found that of a total of 17,333 bankruptcy pro-
ceedings she examined, only 4 percent included a challenge to the creditor’s 
claims.140  Moreover, this occurred in the context of an accompanying finding that 
in over 95 percent of cases, there were discrepancies between the amount of debt 
asserted by the debtor and the creditor, with the creditor usually asserting a larger 
debt.141   
Consumers are even less well-protected in small claims courts where the rules of 
evidence don’t apply.142   But small claims courts are where the vast majority of debt 
collection cases are litigated, and in light of the shoddy documentation typically of-
fered by debt buyers, this now-established system for pursuing consumer debt col-
lections is, in the words of the Federal Trade Commission, “broken.”143  If com-
pliance with the formal rules of evidence is not required in small claims cases, then 
what standard should apply, when all the data is telling us that the companies pur-
suing those claims have very little proof and often even less concern about the legi-
timacy of their claims against consumers?  It is suggested that a more stringent ap-
plication by judges of the personal knowledge requirement is likely enough to solve 
the problem.  If one has no personal knowledge of the facts and figures underlying 
the claim, then proof of that claim is difficult if not impossible.   
D.  Access to Justice 
As many scholars have observed, the lax procedures in small claims courts implicate 
questions of power and access to justice.144  These questions are especially acute in 
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 139. Id. at 146. 
 140. Id. at 168. 
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debt buyer cases.  Over thirty-five years ago, Marc Galanter argued that courts in 
general favor “repeat players” in the legal system, such as debt collectors, because 
they have additional experience with the judicial process, access to experts at rela-
tively low additional costs, informal relationships with court players, “credibility as 
a combatant,” and the ability to play the odds in the long-term in order to maxim-
ize the chances of winning over time.145  In addition, repeat players can influence the 
adoption of rules through legislative change and through repeat arguments to the 
courts.146  As a result, the rules tend to favor repeat players.147  The small claims con-
text seems to bear out Galanter’s argument, in that the lack of rules regarding evi-
dence very much favors creditors, who, until very recently, have enjoyed the trust of 
the courts and thus have been able to steamroll debtors.  The long term impact of 
the robo-signing scandals on this established trust and credibility remains to be 
seen.  And, because debtors rarely have the experience or knowledge necessary to 
challenge creditors in court effectively, they often lose when they do challenge the 
debt buyer in court.  Without lawyers to represent them, consumers are unlikely to 
tap into the knowledge and power necessary to change that dynamic. 
More recently, Russell Engler found that prohibitions against giving advice to 
unrepresented litigants148 are routinely violated, particularly in consumer contexts 
such as landlord/tenant or debtor/creditor disputes.149  Instead, lawyers representing 
debt collectors induce debtors to agree to settlements that run roughshod over their 
rights, including to default judgments because an attorney advised them not to ap-
pear in court.150 
The ultimate consequences of not enforcing the requirements of the business 
records exception are evident in recent litigation concerning debt buyer Palisades, 
which used affidavits to collect debt through small-claims courts.151  A recent depo-
sition shows the sloppiness with which those affidavits were created: 
Lawyer:  What’s your job there (at Palisades)? 
Witness:  I execute affidavits. . . 
Lawyer:   . . . is there any quota or performance goal for the number of affi-
davits you have to execute? 
Witness:  No, there’s no quota. 
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SOC. REV. I, 85, 98–100 (1974). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. (1983). 
 149. Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Un-
represented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 118–22 (1997). 
 150. Id. at 119–20. 
 151. Palisades v. Wagy, CV 2007-10652 (D.N.M. 2007). 
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Lawyer: How many are you expected to execute? 
Witness: At least 2,000. 
Lawyer: 2,000 over what period of time? 
Witness: Per day. 
Lawyer: So you personally execute roughly 2,000 affidavits a day? 
Witness: Well, not every day, but most of the time that’s what our quota is. . 
. .  
Lawyer: Okay.  Do you actually prepare the affidavit? 
Witness: No. 
Lawyer: Who prepares the affidavits? 
Witness: I don’t know. . . . 
Lawyer:  Do you have any knowledge as to where that information actually 
came from that got into the computer system?—Omit objection—  
Witness: No.152 
 
E.  In Light of the Fact That the Debt Collection System is “Broken,” It Is Essential to 
Require Personal Knowledge of Affiants or Testifying Witnesses   
Approaching debt collection cases by enforcing a strict requirement of personal 
knowledge of the debts being collected and the business records which underlie 
those debts would solve many of the problems outlined in Part II.153 It would re-
quire the debt collection and debt buying industries to adopt more reliable practic-
es, keep debt buyers and other collectors from exploiting the courts to bully con-
sumers, eliminate many of the suspicious debts currently in court, and address the 
problem of multiple and competing attempts to collect the same debt. 
First, requiring debt buyers to provide sufficiently documented proof of a con-
sumer’s debt would quickly incentivize those buying the debt to insist on better do-
cumentation from original creditors and others from whom they purchase the debt.  
As the FTC and others have observed, documentation practices are poor, and debt 
buyers themselves have acknowledged as much.154  Currently, however, debt buyers 
do not have any reason to improve their practices. Debt buyers purchase debts for 
pennies on the dollar and therefore do not have the financial incentive to invest 
funds into verifying the validity of these debts.155  Additionally, as noted above, veri-
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fication of these documents is economically unnecessary because debt buyers obtain 
default judgments in the vast majority of their cases.156  
If courts were to insist on requiring adequate documentation of a debt in order 
to enforce it, consumers would be better protected, court dockets would be less 
crowded, and our quality of justice would improve.  For example, if courts began 
using a simple checklist as a screening device, they could quickly weed out cases 
which lacked sufficient proof of standing. In this context, debt buyers would likely 
improve their practices quickly and insist on more reliable documentation from 
those who sell them debt.  The cost would likely rise. 
Enforcing stricter standards for verifying purchased debt would also mitigate the 
problem of duplicative collection efforts.  Again, if a debt buyer were unable to suc-
cessfully collect from a consumer based on untrustworthy documents, he or she 
would be less likely to file a claim against a debtor in the first place, thus keeping 
“bad” claims out of court.  Moreover, even if a debt buyer did attempt to collect, if 
courts were better able to sort out proven claims from those without documenta-
tion, they would be able to keep pseudo-creditors from asserting debts that they do 
not actually own.  Thus, consumers would be better protected unless and until a 
true owner of the debt sought to collect from the consumer at a later point in 
time.157  As indicated above, duplicative lawsuits on a single debt are common in the 
debt collection industry. Allowing debt buyers to sue and introduce documents 
without laying the proper foundation of personal knowledge only increases the risk 
of such duplicative judgments.  Without indicia of trustworthiness and reliability of 
an original creditor’s and each intervening debt buyer’s record keeping practices, it 
is impossible for a court to tell whether a debt buyer’s records contain potential or 
actual errors.  Insisting on such proof, though, would give consumers and courts a 
powerful tool for avoiding error. 
Of course, enforcing existing standards for personal knowledge would require 
more preparation and due diligence on the part of debt buyers, but it would not be 
requiring of them any more than is required of other individuals and industries.  
Put simply, people are not supposed to be allowed to testify about things they have 
no knowledge of.  This is true whether the rules of evidence apply, or not, because 
even in small claims actions, witnesses are sworn to tell the truth.  Further, given the 
well-documented problems in the debt buyer industry,158 meeting the minimal 
standards of personal knowledge and documentation based on personal knowledge 
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hardly seems unwarranted.  It is past time to make the debt buyer industry play by 
the same rules that all other litigants are forced to play by. 
F.  Due Process 
The current “broken” system denies access to justice for some of our citizens.  In 
addition, however, this broken system threatens core issues of due process for all.  
As the Supreme Court found thirty years ago in Mathews v. Eldridge,159 
“[p]rocedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”160  Courts may not affirma-
tively deprive consumers of their property without providing due process of law.  It 
is proposed that neither may they do so by failing to uphold basic principles of due 
process: the entity that allegedly purchased a consumer’s debt must be able to prove 
ownership, liability and damages, based on reliable, relevant personal knowledge.   
As it stands, the general dictate of “informality” in small claims proceedings does 
not provide much guidance as to what thresholds apply to evidence in small claims 
courts—but certainly taking an oath to tell the truth, as all witnesses do, means that 
one can only offer evidence that is based on personal knowledge.  If small claims 
courts are to regain control over their dockets, protect the public and continue to 
ensure the integrity of our system, then they must restore one of the basic tenets of 
due process: a witness should not be allowed to swear to the truth of facts when the 
witness has no personal knowledge of those facts.   
IV. Conclusion 
To protect consumer debtors and ensure that small claims courts are not used by 
debt buyers to obtain bogus judgments, courts must redouble their efforts to make 
sure that the proponent has personal knowledge of the matter at issue before any 
person testifies, before any affidavit is accepted, and before any documents are ad-
mitted into evidence.  Relaxed evidentiary standards do not mean no standards.  
The fact that the formal rules of evidence do not apply does not mean that no rules 
of evidence apply.  To protect the integrity of our courts, to restore faith in due 
process, and to fix the system which the Federal Trade Commission describes as 
“broken,” judges around the country need to reestablish order in the court by en-
forcing the basic touchstone of all adversarial proceedings: the requirement that the 
evidence offered be based on personal knowledge.  Absent this personal knowledge 
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requirement, consumers, courts and society are vulnerable to the continuing bar-
rage of shoddy debt buyer lawsuits and uneven justice. 
 
